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EMU AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT1 
 
Lei Delsen2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 1 January 1999, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was created. The 
currencies of 12 member countries of the European Union (EU) are irrevocably fixed and 
gradually the national currencies will be replaced by one European currency, first the European 
Currency Unit (ECU), and later, on 1 July 2002, by the euro. According to Article 2 of the 
Maastricht Treaty the aim of EMU is to promote ‘sustainable and non-inflationary growth 
respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high 
level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of 
life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.’ From this one 
may expect a positive relationship between EMU and the social environment. 
  
Will EMU attain its aim? The economic debate on the feasibility of EMU focuses on four major 
issues: firstly, the loss of macro-economic policy instruments; secondly, the functioning of the 
labour market as a condition sine qua non for a successful EMU; thirdly, the cohesion that is 
deemed desirable in the EU – convergence between prosperous and less prosperous regions is 
another condition sine qua non for EMU; and, last but not least, institutional convergence. EMU 
is rather difficult to run unless countries achieve a much higher degree of convergence in social 
policy. Hence, EMU will result in a number of structural economic and institutional reforms. 
                                                 
1 Revised and updated version of a paper presented at the international conference ‘Changing working patterns 
in Europe’, organised by the University of ‘Littoral’ Dunkirk and Boulogne-Sur-Mer, France, Dunkirk, 18 
March 1999. I wish to thank the reviewers and the editor of this journal for their useful comments and critique. 
 2 University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen School of Management, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 9108, 
6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Phone: 31 - 24 - 3615890; fax: 31 - 24 – 3612379 ; E-mail: 
L.Delsen@nsm.kun.nl. 
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This article addresses the implications of EMU for the social environment in Europe. Related to 
the social environment the focus is on the quantity and quality of employment, on wages and 
working conditions, and on the social protection systems. Section 2 analyses the impact of EMU 
on employment and unemployment. The implications of the loss of macro-economic policy 
instruments are discussed and the importance of asymmetric national shocks is established. 
Section 3 addresses the role of the labour market as the major shock absorber within EMU and 
its implications for wages and working conditions. Section 4 discusses the impact of EMU on 
the social protection systems. In section 5 conclusions are drawn and some policy 
recommendations are presented. 
 
 
2. IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
2.1. Loss of macro-economic policy instruments 
 
Related to the consequences of EMU for employment and unemployment a distinction can be 
made between the effects during the transition period, and the short-term and the long-term 
consequences of full EMU. The European Commission studied in detail the possible benefits 
and costs from EMU. It is concluded that EMU is likely to induce static and dynamic efficiency 
gains for the participating countries. The euro will help to reinforce the beneficial effects of the 
single market. Increased competition is expected to lower inflation rates, reduce interest rates, 
encourage economic and employment growth and reduce unemployment within the EU. EMU 
reduces the costs and risks of international commercial transactions: elimination of conversion 
costs and of exchange rate risks arising from the use of separate national currencies. According 
to the European Commission these costs amount to nearly half a percentage of EU GDP (EC, 
1990). Although there are surely economic benefits to be expected from a monetary union, the 
main driving force behind EMU concerns political considerations. Its aim is also largely 
political. Monetary union is regarded an engine of European integration (see Fratianni et al., 
1992; Feldmann, 1997). 
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The European Central Bank (ECB) is the supreme monetary authority in the euro area. 
According to the Maastricht Treaty the primary objective of the ECB is ‘to maintain price 
stability’ (zero inflation). Monetarist economists notably believe that there is a negative 
relationship between prices and output: hence low and zero inflation is an essential, or at least a 
very important, condition for high and sustained growth (see, for example, Friedman and 
Schwarz, 1982). On the basis of a cross-country analysis, Stanner (1993), however, concludes 
that there is no empirical evidence for this belief. Monetarist economists, moreover, reason that 
the downward sloping Phillips curve – representing the trade-off between the rate of inflation 
and the unemployment rate – refers to the short run; the long-run Phillips curve is vertical at a 
certain long-run unemployment level.3 Hence in the short run the policymakers have to choose 
between unemployment or inflation, while in the long run the only choice for macro-economic 
policy is the rate of price and wage inflation. Akerlof et al. (1996) ask the question whether zero 
inflation is an appropriate target for monetary policy. Their simulations suggest that the lowest 
sustainable unemployment rate is achievable with a moderate, low and steady inflation rate. 
With zero inflation the sustainable unemployment rate is measurably higher and real output and 
employment are sacrificed. When inflation is zero, real wage reduction can only occur through 
nominal wage reductions. However, nominal wages are downwardly rigid because of money 
illusion.4 Hence, the Phillips curve may be vertical down to a certain minimum value of 
inflation, whereas below this rate the curve is strongly downward sloping. The inability of 
employers to achieve wage reductions causes unemployment. In line with this De Grauwe 
(1998) concludes that within EMU a two to three percent inflation target is more appropriate 
than zero percent. 
 
The pursuit of the five convergence criteria5 established for entering EMU in the Maastricht 
                                                 
 3 Later called the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) or the natural rate of 
unemployment. The natural unemployment rate is determined by the labour market and other institutions that affect 
structural-frictional unemployment, including individual preferences and endowments, characteristics of firms and 
government programmes.  
 4 Money illusion implies that purely nominal changes are mistakenly, but rationally, perceived as real 
changes. 
 5 These five criteria are: average consumer price inflation rate does not exceed by more than one and a 
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Treaty is often considered to be the implementation of sound economic policies (cf. Vinals and 
Jimeno, 1997). However, the Maastricht convergence strategy applied by most EU countries – 
restrictive monetary policy and restrictive fiscal policies (raising taxes or reducing public 
spending) – created deflationary bias during the 1990s. The resulting drop in European 
economic growth led to a higher level of unemployment. It intensified the recession in the first 
part of the 1990s (De Grauwe, 1998). The size of the short-term impact of fiscal consolidation 
on employment and unemployment varies across countries – given their different economic 
structure and present fiscal situations – and also critically depends on which kind of measures 
are implemented, and on how they are implemented (Vinals and Jimeno, 1997). 
 
In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997, requiring Member States to establish a 
budgetary equilibrium or surplus in the medium term, has a deflationary impact. Government 
budgets are robbed of part of their automatic stabilisers, thereby aggravating recessions. A 
fundamental criticism against the Stability Pact – based on the ‘formula of Domar’ on the 
relationship between the size of the budget deficit and the debt to GDP ratio – is that it implies 
that the new EMU norm for the public debt to GDP ratio is set at zero percent instead of sixty 
percent (see for instance De Grauwe, 1998). The reduction of the public debt to zero inevitably 
also imply cuts in government investments in human and physical capital. A slow down of 
economic growth and hence job growth is the result. So, EMU results in a reduction in 
economic growth and more unemployment, not only in the transition period, but also in the 
short run and in the long run after establishment as well. 
 
The quality of the new jobs may also be a cause of concern. The proportion of temporary jobs in 
total employment has been increasing steadily year after year in virtually all EU Member States 
since the late 1980s. Between 1994 and 1998 temporary jobs accounted for eighty five percent 
of the net addition to male employment and forty percent to female employment in the EU. The 
percentage of employees with fixed-term contracts increased from ten percent in 1990 to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
half percentage points the average of the three member states with the lowest inflation rate; long-term interest 
rate does not exceed by two percentage points the average interest rate of the three countries with the lowest 
inflation rate; maximum government budget deficit of three percent of GDP; maximum government debt of sixty 
percent of GDP; exchange rate within the normal band of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) for at least two 
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thirteen percent in 1999. The employment growth of men and women in the 1990s has also 
mainly been in part-time jobs. In the EU the proportion of part-time employment in total 
employment increased from fourteen percent in 1990 to eighteen percent in 1999 (see Delsen, 
1995, 1999; EC, 1999). Considerable numbers of these new part-time jobs were for only a few 
hours per week. EMU intensifies competition and hence the growth of temporary jobs (agency 
work, fixed-term and labour-on-call contracts). These jobs offer the opportunity to shift the 
burden of costs and uncertainty from the employer towards the employees, indicating a 
deterioration of the European social environment. 
 
Apart from economic benefits, the establishment of EMU also is accompanied by one-off as 
well as permanent costs. The first relate for instance to the physical costs of the switch towards 
the new currency. The variability of exchange rates is an important balancing mechanism 
between economies which are at different stages of development and which have different 
economic and institutional structures. However, EMU implies that exchange rates as an 
automatic equaliser are no longer available. EMU also implies that the present 12 Member 
States have lost their monetary sovereignty. The latter may be an important disadvantage and 
represents the permanent costs of EMU. Shocks in the labour markets may give independent 
central banks an incentive to use monetary policy. However, EMU reduces the wage restraining 
role of retaliatory interest rate increases by the national central banks. Inflation and 
unemployment may be the result. Monetary policy of the ECB aims at price stability in the 
whole EMU and is not available to accommodate asymmetric national shocks. Budgetary policy 
also cannot be used in the first years of EMU to absorb asymmetric shocks. Employment will be 
adversely affected; particularly in those EMU countries in which asymmetric shocks are most 
likely and in which labour market rigidities are most pronounced. 
 
2.2. Asymmetric economic shocks and labour market flexibility 
 
Economic theory is divided about whether economic integration and monetary union induces or 
hampers economic convergence. If the sectoral structure of production deviates strongly, crises 
                                                                                                                                                                     
years. 
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in certain sectors will differentially affect the different countries. Research by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1992) shows that, between 1960 and 1988, asymmetric shocks were higher in the 
EU than in the U.S.A. Even in the core region around Germany, including Belgium, Denmark, 
France and the Netherlands, the asymmetry was greater than in a comparable core region of the 
U.S.A., and that the economic development in these countries differed from those in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, and the Southern European states of Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. 
Helg et al. (1995) draw similar conclusions. They make a distinction between country specific, 
industry specific and local shocks, and find that, in terms of local industry developments, 
country developments dominate over industry dimensions. This seems to indicate that 
asymmetric shocks are more common than symmetric shocks. EMU may strengthen this trend, 
when the Member States increasingly specialise in producing goods and services in respect of 
which they have comparative advantages. In particular, the sectors whose production is subject 
to economies of scale could become more regionally concentrated in the monetary union (see 
Krugman, 1991). In addition, also the existence of ‘agglomoration economics’ where 
production tends to cluster geographically due to the existence of numerous production 
linkages, tends to lead to stronger core-periphery patterns. Hence, the heterogeneity of 
economic structures is likely to increase under EMU. This also implies that the probability of 
asymmetric national shocks is likely to increase within EMU. This tendency may be reinforced 
by enlargement of EMU and may cause instability. 
 
More recent research shows that the EU is evolving into a Europe of the regions. These 
economic regions are often trans-national. Forni and Reichlin (1997) and Vinals and Jimeno 
(1997) both found that regional shocks are at least as important as national shocks in explaining 
short- and long-term movements in unemployment in the EU. Fatás (1997) found that, relative 
to asymmetric shocks, the number of common shocks increases in time. His research also shows 
that the economic significance of the national borders decreases over time. Sectoral shocks are 
also of importance. Marimon and Zilibotti (1998) found that sectoral effects account for eighty 
percent of the long-run variations in employment growth across countries and industries, 
whereas country-specific effects only account for twenty percent. The introduction of the Euro 
likely implies that competition for jobs and capital investment among (cross-border) regions 
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increasingly replaces competition among individual EMU countries (see Rees and 
Sonnenholzner, 2000). 
 
In order to avoid negative shocks from resulting in structural unemployment in certain sectors 
and regions, flexible labour markets are conditions sine qua non. Blanchard and Katz (1992) 
found in the U.S.A. that the effect of regional employment (asymmetric) shocks was mainly 
compensated for by migration and not by an adjustment of wages. Consequently, they argue, 
balancing the labour market in the future EMU will be much more difficult. If even in the 
U.S.A., where wages are much more flexible, the wage mechanism does not considerably 
contribute to offsetting regional imbalances, this will be even more difficult in Europe. 
Moreover, labour mobility in Europe, as well as within individual countries, is much lower 
than in the U.S.A. Eichengreen (1990) found similar results. Particularly in Europe regional 
shocks have persistent effects, partly due to the low propensity of workers to migrate away 
from regions where unemployment exceeds the local natural rate (Obstfeld and Peri, 1998; 
Décressin and Fatás, 1995). Moreover, fiscal federalism in the U.S.A. acts as an automatic 
regional stabiliser through taxes and transfers. The federal budget is relatively large. Federal 
taxes and transfers cushion regional GDP shocks. A region in the U.S.A. that is hit by an 
adverse shock receives more transfers and pays less taxes, while the opposite holds for a 
region which experience a favourable shock. Because of the current small size of the federal 
EU budget there is little or no automatic stabilisation from federal fiscal taxation and 
government spending. Absence of automatic fiscal stabilisers and of labour mobility implies 
that the monetary union in Europe will ceteris paribus result in higher unemployment rates. 
However, the impact varies between Member States. European budgetary transfers provide 
the participation countries in EMU a cushion against asymmetric macro-economic shocks. 
Van Aarle (1996) shows that in the EMU fiscal transfers might successfully act as a substitute 
for the shock-absorbing capacity of exchange rate realignments and for the automatic 
stabilising role of federal government spending and taxation that occurs in a mature fiscal 
federation. 
 
Table 1. Classification of EU countries* by vulnerability to asymmetric shocks and 
labour market flexibility 
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     Labour market flexibility** 
 
    High    Low 
 
    Group 1   Group 3 
   Low Netherlands, Austria   Germany, France 
Probability       Belgium (Denmark) 
of        
asymmetric 
shocks    Group 2   Group 4 
   High Ireland, Portugal  Finland, Italy, 
    (United Kingdom)  Greece, Spain (Sweden) 
 
*Non-EMU members in parentheses. 
**Relative to EU average. 
Source: Dohse et al., 1999. 
 
 
Although differences in sectoral and regional development are becoming more important, this 
does not mean that the asymmetry between countries has disappeared. Asymmetric national 
shocks cannot be excluded altogether. So, the loss of national macro-economic policy 
instruments represents a risk. Moreover, the desired cross-border regional and sectoral 
consultation structures to co-ordinate wage developments are not (yet) available. Increasing 
unemployment rates and a growing polarisation between strong and weak sectors, and between 
core and peripheral regions, may be the result. This is a threat to EMU, for economic and social 
cohesion worsens when regional disparities increase. Table 1 shows that EMU involves a 
substantially higher risk of increasing unemployment for Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain, than 
for Austria and the Netherlands, while France, Germany and Belgium are in an intermediate 
position: rather low labour market flexibility and below average vulnerability to asymmetric 
shocks. The likelihood of asymmetric shocks is considered high in the case of striking 
peculiarities; for example, in terms of production, and export structure, and dependence on 
commodity imports. Labour markets are considered inflexible if wages are rigid, working time 
is inelastic and the geographical mobility of workers is low. The fact that countries differ in 
terms of labour market flexibility implies that even a common shock in the EMU area will have 
different consequences for unemployment. 
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3. IMPACT ON WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
 
3.1. Wage flexibility and wage moderation 
 
Unlike financial policy, social policy in Europe is mainly national policy. Authority is not 
substantially transferred to European decision-making and is a cause for policy competition. In 
this respect, social dumping refers to unfair competition between national systems caused by 
differential wages, working conditions and social costs. Countries with low social standards, 
and hence lower labour costs, have a comparative advantage. This comparative advantage gets 
more weight in EMU. Countries are tempted to continuously adjust to shocks by wage cuts, and 
cuts in social contributions and taxes and hence the social protection system in order to attract 
foreign investment and to make home-located firms more competitive. More transparency will 
increase competition in social security programmes. So, social dumping is likely to get worse 
under EMU (Miller, 1993; Berghman, 1996; Guillaume et al., 1996).  
 
Members of a successful monetary union should have flexible labour markets. Because of the 
low intra-EU labour mobility, wage negotiations are the only instrument to take over the role of 
the exchange rate instrument within EMU to offset differential trends. Any change in the 
national nominal wage level will directly affect the relative unit costs for a given development 
in productivity: in a monetary union nominal wage policy equals real wage policy. Hence, the 
social partners will be responsible for the level of employment to an even greater extent than 
before. EMU forces social partners to base their wage policy on productivity and unit costs 
(Rhein, 1995). In fact, the regional competitiveness is at stake when, within EMU, nominal 
wage increases are not restricted by the expected productivity increases in the own country and 
the unit wage costs in other countries. Horn et al. (1999) argue that such a productivity-oriented 
wage policy not only allows the countries lagging behind to catch up with the high productivity 
level countries, but also promotes Europe-wide economic growth. All EMU member countries 
have to follow this rule. However, this is not yet the case. In particular, in the Southern 
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European countries wage finding is different from the rest of the EMU (see also Schramm, 
2001). These differences in national wage-setting procedures imply that convergence of price 
developments can only be reached by divergence in unemployment rates. 
 
In the 1980s the internationalisation of the economies and the accompanying increase in 
competitive pressure and scaling up on the product market resulted in a decentralisation of 
wage bargaining in Europe (Hartog and Teeuwes, 1993). EMU intensifies competition 
between companies and enables firms to take more advantages of economies of scale. That is 
why EMU is likely to encourage the further decentralisation of collective bargaining to the 
workplace level. At the same time, EMU will encourage the further Europeanisation of 
bargaining (EIRR, 1999). Empirical studies show that decentralisation and reduced co-
ordination of wage bargaining in Europe reduce real-wage flexibility at the national level, but 
does not increase regional real-wage flexibility (Schramm, 2001). To create the wage 
flexibility required for monetary union means the abolition of the legal extension of the 
provisions of a collective agreement to cover employers and employees not party to the 
agreement. EMU might widen the income gap between EU member countries and regions, 
which will undermine the political support for the European integration process. For example, 
in Portugal labour productivity is only thirty-five percent of the level in West Germany 
(Nunnenkamp, 1999). Also Greece, Spain and Ireland are countries with the lowest 
productivity levels. However, co-ordination is the most realistic route (EIRR, 1999; 
Feldmann, 1997; Obstfeld and Peri, 1998). In fact, the European Metalworkers Federation 
(EMF) already took the first steps in this direction in December 1998 by adopting the ‘wage 
co-ordination rule’ for the collective bargaining by its member organisations in the metal 
sector across Europe. In the ‘Doorn declaration’ (September 1998) trade unions of the 
Benelux and Germany agreed to intensify co-operation and co-ordination related to wage 
policy and collective labour agreements. The major aim of this co-ordination is to prevent 
underbidding. 
 
EMU-wide wage bargaining is desired to reduce the damaging regime competition and to 
limit cross-border migration. Moreover, sharp movements in intra-EMU wages or 
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competitiveness levels would undermine support for the single market. There will be a 
tendency to increase wages in the economically weaker countries in the monetary union to the 
levels of those in the countries with stronger economies. Employers and employees in the 
richer countries will support this because they benefit from it. Trade unions and employees in 
the poorer countries will use the higher level of wages as the benchmark for their own wage 
claims. This convergence, i.e. upward harmonisation in wages will result in costs increasing 
more than productivity gains. Indeed, in the second half of the 1990s and in 2000 and 2001 
productivity growth in the low-wage countries Portugal, Greece and notably Ireland was 
clearly above the EU average. Also nominal wage increases were well above the EU average 
in these countries. This indicates an upward convergence of productivity and wage levels in 
Euroland. However, as a result also the annual growth of unit labour costs in Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and also Spain is above average, indicating a deterioration of competitiveness, which 
can result in a slower economic growth and job losses (Kabki, 2001). Moreover, the desire for 
wage harmonisation will bring increased demands for transfer payments to the weaker 
countries. This will reward and stimulate inappropriate behaviour by trade unions (moral 
hazard). Moreover, in the richer countries the taxes have to be raised to finance the increasing 
inter-country stabilisation transfer payments, reducing incentives, weakening growth and, 
finally, undermining the ability to make transfer payments to the poorer countries. At Medio 
1999 in Helsinki the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) agreed to conclude 
international collective agreements within five years. The introduction of the euro was the 
main cause for this unity in the ETUC. This co-ordination of wages not only avoids 
competition between European trade unions and hence underbidding, but it also prevents an 
upward wage spiral due to the absence of retaliatory interest rate increases. However, this co-
ordination of wage bargaining at the European level also makes it impossible to create 
additional jobs or retain jobs in a country by means of wage moderation at national level in 
response to a national asymmetric shock. Structural unemployment may occur. 
 
In 1994, at the Top in Essen the European Commission recommended a wage moderation 
policy to the Member States in order to create jobs. Wage moderation implies real wage 
increases below productivity increases. In the first half of the 1990s, in the majority of the EU 
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countries, wage moderation was applied not only to create jobs but also as a result of the 
preparation for entry into monetary union (Fajertag, 1997). However, in Germany the policy of 
wage moderation came to an end, partly because of disappointing employment results, partly 
because of the loss of monetary autonomy. IG Metal recently abandoned the wage moderation 
strategy in order to prevent wage dumping (Kabki, 2001). In Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
U.K. the tightening labour market creates an upward pressure on wage that hampers wage 
moderation. After the introduction of the euro a policy of wage cost moderation becomes even 
more effective to improve the country’s competitive position than in the transition period. 
However, reliance on low pay for jobs or competitive survival may imply falling into a low-
productivity trap. Wages not only represent a cost factor, they are also a source for effective 
demand, and provide employers and employees with positive incentives to innovate and to 
increase productivity. Application of wage moderation by all EU countries may imply a 
deflationary spiral and cause a Europe-wide recession, as well as a loss of economic growth 
(Delsen and De Jong, 1998; Horn et al., 1999), making EMU more unpopular. Moreover, wage 
moderation does not necessarily result in additional investments and hence in more jobs. Under 
the present circumstances it is more likely to result in greater return on capital, i.e. higher share-
holder value. 
 
3.2 Working conditions 
 
Within the EU there are considerable differences with respect to the work environment. In the 
Northern countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom) the quality of the work environment is above average. In the Southern European 
countries (Spain, Portugal, France, Italy and Greece) and Ireland, the overall quality of working 
life is below average. Smulders et al. (1996) explain these inter-country differences by 
economic factors (GDP per head) and cultural factors (norms and values). The differences in 
national systems act as an incentive for companies to practice social dumping. Jobs may be or 
threatened to be relocated to regions where labour is cheapest and least protected, with the risk 
that in due course the national systems will be harmonised on the lowest level of protection 
(Guillaume et al., 1996). In the EU Member States temporary workers and short part-time jobs 
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are not always fully covered by employment protection law and social security. This results in 
an increase in marginal jobs (insecure, short, part-time jobs and temporary jobs). Poverty and 
dependency may be the result. The differences in the national labour law and social security 
systems regarding part-time work, fixed-term contracts and agency work are likely to result in 
an increase of the distortion of competition and social dumping. For instance, temporary 
employment businesses could recruit a temporary employee on one side of the frontier for the 
purpose of providing services to a company in the neighbouring country, but not comply with 
the rules in force of that country (Delsen, 1995). The volume of trans-national temping is likely 
to increase after the introduction of the euro. Competition between the Member States may lead 
to the weakening of health and safety protection (O'Reilly et al., 1996). In addition, competition 
between trade unions on working conditions may be expected. The prospects for pay freezes 
and pay reductions in the high wage countries seems remote. The decentralisation of wage 
bargaining towards the enterprise level increases the power of the ‘insiders’. Employment will 
take the brunt, with managers and employees (‘insiders’) protecting themselves at the expense 
of those not in work (‘outsiders’) by adjusting working time and/or the number of employees to 
achieve comparable levels of unit costs rather than reducing pay (see EIRR, 1999). 
 
European minimum standards of working conditions and social protection are necessary to 
counteract the incentive towards social dumping in EMU. Social minimum conditions also help 
to eliminate social inequalities across Member States and, therefore, solidify the European 
Union. Abraham (1996) questions these arguments for a social union. Social harmonisation 
reduces the ability of lower-income countries in the EU to make full use of their comparative 
cost advantages, and thereby to catch up with more advanced economies. The European social 
dimension may result in economic divergence; a widening of the regional income gap. Snower 
(1996) argues that the implementation of the ‘Social Charter’ by the European Commission will 
help the established, incumbent workers (insiders) at the expense of the outsiders (the long-term 
unemployed, the school leavers, the temporary workers). Hence, the Social Charter hurts 
precisely the people whom it was meant to help. 
 
EMU and the euro accelerate the present shift from the stake-holder capitalism of the Rhineland 
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towards Anglo-Saxon share-holder capitalism, i.e. a shift from non-market co-ordination via the 
government or consultation towards market co-ordination via the functioning of the price 
mechanism. This shift applies to the institutional structure of the labour markets and the product 
markets, as well as to the financial markets (Delsen and De Jong, 1998), and results in a major 
change in corporate governance: the focus is increasingly on short-term financial results. Higher 
profit margins and share-holder value are the main motivation for mergers and reorganisations, 
and for the selling, closing and buying of business parts. This has major implications for the 
social environment. Within larger firms co-operation is replaced by competition between 
departments and business parts: labour is mainly seen as a cost factor and is increasingly 
becoming a commodity rather than an investment, i.e. human capital. This constitutes the basis 
for the ‘flexibilisation’ of labour. Temporary jobs often have poor working conditions (Delsen, 
1995; Paoli, 1997; 2001. The latter not only refers to hourly wages, fringe benefits and 
advancement. Temporary workers also are more exposed to physical hazards and a higher level 
of work intensity than permanent workers. These still are a primary cause of health problems of 
workers in the EU. Hence, the in previous section (2.1) reported structural growth of temporary 
work, partly induced by EMU, implies a deterioration of working conditions. 
 
 
4. IMPACT ON SOCIAL PROTECTION 
 
 
There are considerable differences in social protection systems between the EU member 
countries. In general, expenditure on social protection is much higher in the North than in the 
South of the EU, reflecting differences in GDP per head and differences in the scale of 
protection provided. However, social expenditure as a percentage of GDP shows some 
upward convergence (see Delsen et al., 2000; EC, 1998; Alber and Standing, 2000). National 
social security systems have firm historical roots and are interwoven with the political, 
economic and judicial systems and reflect cultural differences. Also vested interests make it 
highly unlikely that any substantial harmonisation will be achieved is a systematic way. A 
creeping convergence resulting from indirect pressure rather than direct policies is more likely 
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(Delsen et al., 2000). The most important impact of EMU on social protection is through its 
effect on national budgets and spending policy (De Grauwe, 1992; Berghman, 1996). In the 
transition period towards EMU, in countries with the worst budgetary position – Greece, 
Spain, Italy, and Belgium – the convergence process is connected with the lowering of their 
social standards (see Miller, 1993). FNV (1999) reports that the fulfilment of the EMU-criteria 
was a policy goal of social security reform in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Finland, Sweden, 
United Kingdom. Also the reduction of costs of the social security system, of the state budget 
deficits, and the labour cost reduction were a cause for social security reform in the EU over 
the past years (FNV, 1999; Delsen et al., 2000). It includes a shift from universal and social 
insurance to selective means-tested social protection and a trend towards ‘residual’ welfare 
states (see Alber and Standing, 2000; Delsen et al., 2000). In theory a paid job is the ultimate 
guarantee for social security and a remedy against poverty. Based on this notion the social 
security systems in the EU put more emphasis on reintegration and the obligation to work. 
Increasingly benefits are conditional on accepting work or training. However, means-tested 
social benefits might push the effective marginal tax rate above one hundred percent. It is 
impossible for benefit recipients to raise their net disposable income by accepting a (better) 
paid job resulting in unemployment and poverty traps. Also the growth of marginal jobs may 
imply an increasing number of working poor. The austerity of the social security system 
induced by EMU (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Spain, France) contributes to this growth of 
insecure jobs (Delsen et al., 2000). Moreover, within EMU, people could be attracted to 
emigrate by the prospect of either higher benefits or higher wages in other member countries. 
The euro makes it possible to directly compare the levels of social security benefits in 
different countries. This increase in transparency between national social protection systems 
might make social tourism easier and more attractive. Social tourism – increased flows of 
labour to the richer regions – may have a major impact on social security in the EU. Adverse 
selection is the result: countries with relatively high protection (benefit) levels attract high 
risk individuals, resulting in increasing costs of the social security system. On the other hand, 
high benefit levels imply high tax and premium rates. The latter induce people with low risks 
to leave the area or country: the financial base becomes narrower. 
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However, it is unlikely that social tourism will significantly increase under EMU, because 
access to benefit payments is still tightly circumscribed, the rights of EU citizens are still 
ineffective and restricted, and migration is not yet a socially-acceptable option for the greater 
part of the EU population and its government. To be more specific, free movement of people 
in the EU is limited to employed people, with the exception of family members. Citizens 
from EU Member States that are not economically are not free to settle in a Member State. 
Recipients of unemployment benefits are only allowed to settle in another EU country to look 
for a job for less than three months, without loss of social security rights. The unemployment 
benefit is paid in local currency by the home country. This implies there is no incentive for 
unemployed people in a low benefit/low wage EU Member State to look for a job in an 
expensive high benefit/high wage EU country. Temporary inverted social tourism from high 
benefit/high wage countries to less expensive low benefit/low wage countries is more likely. 
Inactive people without an unemployment benefit or without income are only allowed to 
settle in another EU Member State when financial guaranties are given by a third party. 
Unlike in the U.S.A., the vast majority of EU citizens are reluctant to leave their country in 
search for better living conditions. Differences in language and culture are the most important 
barriers limiting mobility. Labour migration affecting EU citizens is, therefore, not a 
significant phenomenon and is currently showing no signs of increasing. Nor is any 
significant increase in mobility within the EU expected for the future, with the exception of 
executives and specialists (Miller, 1993; Van den Broeck, 1996; Vandamme, 2000). In theory 
low mobility indicates little divergence between regions. However, in the European Union 
there still are large and growing regional disparities. Rates of unemployment vary much 
markedly between regions in the EU than between countries (EC, 2001). Moreover, the 
regional and cohesion policies of the European Commission, which have strong political 
support, are expressly designed to avoid people having to migrate to find work and to enable 
them to stay in their home region. Increasingly, the policy emphasis has been to reduce 
regional problems through structural programmes, rather than to encourage migration (EC, 
1997). Large-scale intra-European migration is perceived as socially disruptive. According to 
Obstfeld and Peri (1998) EMU is likely to put in place incentives to remain at home. 
However, the extension of the EU towards eastern Europe, as well as a relaxation of the 
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regulation of migration without work, will put pressure on the various social security systems. 
At present, several EU Member States are adapting their migration policies to cope with 
specific deficits in labour market supply. With a very few exceptions internal EU migration 
decreased slightly in the 1990s, while international extra-EU migration recently increased 
during the 1990s: the level of net migration – the difference between inflows and outflows of 
migrants - in the EU is increasing (EC, 2001). 
 
In theory the low mobility also implies that the differences in the social security systems 
within the EU do not really matter. As a considerable part of the wage costs in continental 
Europe are taxes and premiums, there is a direct link between macro-economic competitiveness 
and social protection. Intensified by EMU, social dumping may ceteris paribus result in social 
convergence towards an ever lower level, and thus in a general deterioration of social protection 
within the EU. Social protection and regional cohesion are positively related. So, the social 
cohesion in the EU is at stake. Such a ‘race to the bottom’ is also a threat to the political 
consensus that is required for the European integration process to be successful (Abraham, 
1996). Alber and Standing (2000) conclude that compatible with the notion of race to the 
bottom there has been a trend to lower social spending relative to a given level of wealth. 
European minimum standards can stop the reduction of social protection. Economic 
convergence is a necessary condition for social convergence. In case of considerable economic 
differences between Member States, harmonisation of social protection at a high level will 
imply a relative increase in costs and a deterioration of the competitiveness of the weaker 
countries. This will increase the existing economic differences, while the aim of EMU is to 
promote convergence of economic performance. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The implications of EMU and the euro for the social environment are plenty. Firstly, the loss of 
macro-economic policy instruments may result in a growing polarisation between strong and 
weak sectors and regional disparities. This divergence of economic performance worsens social 
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cohesion. Secondly, EMU will have a serious impact on national labour markets. EMU has a 
negative impact on the quantity of jobs. In the transition period, because of restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policies, EMU has a deflationary impact. Also the Stability and Growth Pact has a 
deflationary impact. Apart from this negative short term impact on employment, the Stability 
Pact also has a negative impact on economic growth and hence employment growth in the long 
term. The euro will also have a negative effect on the quality of employment. EMU accelerates 
the present shift towards share-holder capitalism characterised by short-termism. Labour is 
increasingly considered a commodity. EMU intensifies the growth of temporary and marginal 
jobs. Thirdly, relating to working conditions, wages and social protection a ‘race to the bottom’ 
is set in motion by EMU. None of the countries will actually bear the fruits. As a result of EMU 
the need for social protection is growing, while, on the other hand, EMU reduces the quality of 
the social environment and the resources to finance this protection. EMU has conflicting aims. 
A negative relationship between EMU and the social environment is the result. 
 
EMU puts the desirability of cross border wage co-ordination, and co-ordination of the policy 
on employment conditions, high on the agenda in order to avoid social dumping. Within EMU 
minimum standards and social harmonisation clash with productivity differences between EU 
countries. This might widen the income gap between the Northern and Southern EU Member 
States, which will undermine the political support for the European integration process. 
Transfers from the richer North to the poorer South seem unavoidable. This necessitates the 
creation of a European system of transfers, and hence more involvement of the European 
Commission in social security. However, a permanent financial stream from North to South 
may also be a threat to consensus. Automatic stabilisers seem more appropriate: European fiscal 
federalism seems needed. 
 
EMU is likely to result in earnings below the minimum subsistence level. EMU intensified 
competition and hence the growth of marginal jobs. These marginal jobs are usually available 
for lower job levels an have poorer working conditions than permanent workers. Moreover, 
temporary workers and small part-time jobs are not always fully covered by employment 
protection law and the social security system. Also the austerity of social security and the 
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obligation to work will contribute to this increase in the number of marginal jobs. Also the 
tendency towards productivity-oriented wage policy implies that the threat of working poor and 
dependency is real. Moreover, the expected growth of temporary work will, in the case of job 
loss, result in an increase in the number of supplementary benefits up to the minimum level. 
Workers may fall into unemployment and poverty traps. Because of this Europe will unavoidab-
ly be confronted with the problem of a guaranteed minimum income, disconnected from paid 
work. The social security systems in many EU countries aim at exclusion, rather than a 
transition towards employment. A reduction in the social burden requires a reform of social 
security systems. Related to this, I have proposed elsewhere (Delsen, 1997; Delsen et al., 2000) 
a new concept of full-employment that combines the right to at least a part-time job guaranteed 
by the government and the legal right to a (partial) basic income, conditional on the acceptance 
of at least a part-time job. This new concept is not only economically efficient, but is also 
socially desirable. It can be conceived as an initiative towards a more active labour market 
policy and an activating social security system. 
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